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MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE EXCLUSIVITY
PRINCIPLE: CONFLICT UNDER THE NLRA
In the past few decades the National Labor Relations Act'
has made it possible for employees, once powerless in relation to
their employers, to band together in unions and protect their in-
terest by standing united behind a single representative. An es-
sential element in developing this unified force has been the so-
called exclusivity principle, the National Labor Relations Board en-
forced policy that once a union is elected to represent a bargain-
ing unit, then it alone has the right to represent employee in-
terests and employees may no longer separately bargain for their
rights with their employer.
The operation of this doctrine raises a critical problem when
minority workers, whether individually or as a group, seek to by-
pass union channels to protest an employer's alleged acts of racial
discrimination. A conflict is thus created between rights of mi-
nority employees and the admittedly crucial principle of exclusive
representation. The questions raised by the conflict are difficult
ones. May minority workers take their protest outside of the pro-
cedures established by their bargaining representative and their
employer and still retain the protection of the Act? Are they
prevented from acting in concert,2 other than through the union,
by the NLRA provisions giving exclusive bargaining rights to
the union representative? 3  Are minority rights greater where an
issue of racial discrimination is raised? Any attempt to resolve
these issues must start with an understanding of the interaction of
the exclusivity principle and the duty of fair representation.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970) [hereinafter cited as N.L.R.A. or the Act].
2. N.L.R.A. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) reads in part:
Employees shall have the right . . . to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ....
3. N.L.R.A. § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) reads:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employ-
ees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to
rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of em-
ployment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of em-
ployees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention
of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not incon-
sistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has
been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
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TE EXCLUSIVITY PRINCIPLE
In administering the Act, the National Labor Relations Board
has established various policies which have been subjected to jud-
icial scrutiny. This scrutiny has often resulted in court opin-
ions that become the foundation for future Board policy. It is
by this process that a number of crucial principles of labor-man-
agement relations have evolved, including the principle of exclusiv-
ity.
In NLRB v. Draper Corporation,4 union members were fired
for conducting an unauthorized strike in an attempt to pressure
their employer to continue negotiations on a collective bargaining
agreement. The workers sought reinstatement on the ground that
they were merely exercising their right to act in concert under
section 7 of the Act.' The court, in refusing to order reinstate-
ment, gave judicial birth to the concept of exclusivity. The court
reasoned that if workers were to bargain with their employer on a
unified basis, individual actions by splinter groups of workers could
not be tolerated. The multiple demands which would result would
unfairly burden employers. The court held that a minority of em-
ployees had "no right to take independent action to interfere with
the course of bargaining which is being carried on by the duly
authorized bargaining agent chosen by the majority."
This ruling, no doubt, was greeted favorably by both em-
ployers and union organizations. Employers were guaranteed
that they would have to deal with only one group of negotia-
tors. Union officials saw this decision as reinforcing and legiti-
matizing the unions' position as negotiators for working people.
The only serious aberration from the exclusivity principle
enunciated in Draper occurred in the case of NLRB v. R.C.
Can Co.' In that decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
suggested that the purpose of the exclusivity principle was to avoid
a situation in which an employer would be faced with conflicting
demands from different segments of a single employee group.
If a minority group of workers confined their protest to subjects
in which they had no disagreement with the union position, the
employer would not be faced with competitive demands from dif-
ferent interest groups. 8 This approach may be contrasted with
4. 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The Board decision upheld the claims of the
discharged workers. Draper Corp., 55 N.L.R.B. 1477, 13 L.R.R.M. 88 (1943).
6. 145 F.2d at 203.
7. 328 F.2d 974 (5th Cir. 1964). The facts in this case were similar to
those of Draper. There was a "quickie strike" over stalled negotiations. Eight
workers out of approximately fifty conducted a strike from 10:00 a.m. until 3:30
p.m. of the same day, at which time they requested to return to work.
8. Id. at 979.
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the Draper rationale, which would not allow any concerted ac-
tivities by a minority group of workers whether or not their de-
mands were in opposition to those of the bargaining representa-
tive.9
The conflict between these approaches came to a head in
NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd.10 In that case, two em-
ployees had been discharged for picketing in support of a non-
discriminatory hiring policy. Their discharge was found to be in
violation of the Act and an order for reinstatement was issued by
the Board." On appeal the court remanded to the Board the
question: were the discharges, otherwise illegal under section 7
of the Act, legitimatized due to the existence of an exclusive bar-
gaining agent which precluded certain activities by individual
workers? An earlier decision in the Tanner case 2 had suggested
that the question of non-discriminatory hiring could not be a basis
for an individual grievance as it was a condition of employment
affecting the entire bargaining unit and thus subject to the union's
exclusive right of representation. Therefore, the chief question
presented in the most recent Tanner decision was to what extent
this vesting of rights in the bargaining representative cut off mi-
nority employees' rights to engage in protected concerted activity
under section 7 of the Act.
Despite the peaceful nature of the protest undertaken by the
minority employees in this case, the court chose to apply the rule
of Draper, rather than that of the R.C. Can case. A crucial factor
in this decision was the failure on the part of the protesting work-
ers to first seek redress of their grievances through existing union
channels. In refusing to order reinstatement of the discharged
workers, the court reaffirmed the doctrine of exclusivity.
Failure to use prescribed union procedures has the effect of
challenging the stability of the union's political system. The
courts, although cognizant of the political dynamics of union or-
ganization and the problems they may pose for minority em-
ployees, have placed a higher priority on the institutional equal-
ity of labor and management in the collective bargaining forum.
A stable labor-management bargaining relationship is deemed
more important than the right of minority employees to assert
their special interests. The imposition of the exclusivity prin-
9. The decision in R.C. Can was quickly undermined by the same Fifth Cir-
cuit Court in NLRB v. Cactus Petroleum, Inc., 355 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966),
which held that although a minority strike is not necessarily unlawful, partici-
pants in such a strike may be discharged.
10. 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969).
11. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402, 57 L.R.R.M. 1170
(1964).
12. NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 349 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1965).
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ciple is an attempt to discourage minority action in order to pre-
serve the operating effectiveness of unions versus management.
This legal protection has benefitted the union movement.1"
Judging from the acceptance of unions in our society, there can
be no question as to their success. Labor gains were achieved
through the efforts of a representative who could bargain with
the knowledge that he would not be undermined by the workers
he represented. "United we stand, divided we fall" rings true in
this context. On matters that are of concern to the entire unit of
workers, the necessity for a single exclusive representative cannot
be questioned.
When the exclusivity principle does not work in behalf of the
entire group, however, its application may be deleterious. The
court in Tanner strongly hints that there are situations in which
the Tanner decision might be distinguishable. The court recog-
nizes "the problem of what action is proper when the intra-union
processes produce a majority decision which is outside legally ac-
ceptable bounds."14  In other words, the court acknowledges that
there may be situations where a decision emanating from union
procedures may be so unjust as to warrant independent action by
the aggrieved party. It is possible therefore, to interpret Tanner
to mean that allegations of racial discrimination will not auto-
matically be precluded by the exclusivity principle merely be-
cause they were raised by a minority of workers rather than the
union.
THi DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Although the elimination of racial discrimination has not
been the primary concern of the Board, the problem has not been
totally ignored. Through application of a relatively recent policy"
the Board has sought to eliminate discrimination when it occurs
within intra-union procedures. This duty of fair representation
on the part of unions assures members of some protection in pro-
cessing any grievance through union channels.
From an intra-union political standpoint, the temptation to
discriminate against minority members of a union always exists.
This is especially true in the case of racial minorities. Union of-
13. Union membership has increased from less than nine million in 1940
to nearly twenty million members in 1970. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES 249 (94th ed. 1971).
14. 419 F.2d at 221.
15. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 177 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
181, 47 L.R.R.M. 2178 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d (2d Cir. 1963).
These decisions have stood for the proposition that a union acting as exclusive
bargaining agent for its members had a statutory duty to fairly represent all em-
ployees. A failure of this duty can result in an unfair labor practice.
[Vol. 14
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ficials are elected from within their own ranks. They are usually
long-standing members whose success is measured by their ability
to best represent the needs of their fellow members. If they fail
to do so they will lose the next election; this is the essence of a
democratic system. The majority of a union that elects its of-
ficials and representatives is justified in believing that these offi-
cials will keep the majority's interest in mind when dealing with
union matters. If a minority group is pursuing a goal of more
jobs for minorities, the interests of the majority are involved.
More jobs for minorities invariably mean fewer jobs for the ma-
jority.
The courts have been sensitive to this problem. In Steele
v. Louisville-Nashville R.R. Co.,16 black workers sought to en-
join the enforcement of an agreement that was designed to abridge
their employment within the railroad industry. The agreement
had been suggested by the union which was the authorized bar-
gaining representative for the black workers, despite their exclu-
sion from its membership. The Supreme Court stated that,
[u]nless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty
to represent non-union members of the craft . . . the mi-
nority would be left with no means of protecting their interest,
or indeed, their right to earn a livelihood by pursuing the
occupation in which they are employed. 17
Avoiding this duty would leave minority members of the union,
regardless of their race, at the mercy of union officials. Such
potential for tyranny is contrary to the principles of our society.
The union's duty of fair representation goes beyond the mere
negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme
Court has indicated that,
collective bargaining is a continuous process. Among other
things, it involves day-to-day adjustments in the contract and
other working rules, resolution of new problems not covered
by the existing agreement, and the protection of employees'
rights already secured by contract. . . . The bargaining rep-
resentative can no more unfairly discriminate in carrying
out these functions than it can in negotiating a collective
agreement.18
In a case in which the union refused to process grievances
on behalf of black workers, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that under section 7 of the Act, workers had a right to be
represented without invidious discrimination. A breach of this
right was held to be unfair labor practice. 9
16. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
17. 1d. at 194.
18. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957).
19. Local Union 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic Workers of
1974]
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The effect of the joint operation of the exclusivity doctrine
and the duty of fair representation is to protect workers
from racial discrimination when they take action through union
processes and those processes are shown to be discriminatory.
Where workers have attempted -to operate outside of union chan-
nels, the courts have been unwilling to reach the merits of their
complaints since the action was considered to be in derogation of
labor policy.
THE WESTERN ADDITION CASE
Western Addition Community Organization v. NLRB 20 rep-
resents the most recent court decision on the matter of concerted
activities by minority workers outside of union channels.
Two employees of a San Francisco department store con-
tended that their employer discriminated on racial grounds in
promoting employees. Both employees, who were black, had
worked in the store for more than a year and were members
of the Department Store Employees' Union, the elected bargain-
ing representative for employees of the store.2 At the time of the
alleged discrimination and resultant picketing there was a con-
tract between the union and the store that contained both an
anti-discrimination clause and a clause calling for arbitration of
employees' complaints.22
Union officials were informed of the complaints by members
and commenced their own investigation. A report by the union
was presented to company officials in April, 1968. At that time
the company indicated a willingness to "look into" the matter,23
and the union informed its members that it would seek an arbi-
tration of the issue. The matter remained unresolved for several
months,2 4 while the union repeatedly assured the employees who
had originally voiced the complaint that it would take action.
The union and company then attempted to deal with the mat-
ter on an individual basis. The two employees, along with oth-
ers, rejected this procedure and took independent action which
included peaceful picketing and the holding of a press conference.
After a formal warning by the store management, the two em-
America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
837 (1967).
20. 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3457 (U.S.
Oct. 27, 1973) (No. 73-696).
21. 485 F.2d at 920.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The reason for this delay was apparently the impending summer vacation
of one of the participants in the matter. Id.
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ployees were dismissed for engaging in a second day of peaceful
picketing. A charge was filed with the Board alleging that firing
the employees was illegal since they were engaged in protected,
concerted activity. The charge was dismissed and the dismissal
affirmed by a divided Board."
The Board's rationale for its dismissal was that although em-
ployees have a right to seek improvement of their working con-
ditions, the issue in this case was relevant to the working con-
ditions of all the store's employees and therefore subject to the
Tanner exclusivity rule. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed the Board and remanded the case. The court
recognized that any interference with the established relation-
ship between the union and the employer was limited and that this
interference was not, by itself, "sufficient to remove these con-
certed activities from the protection of the Act.'' 26
It is not clear whether the court views this matter within
the criteria set forth in Tanner. The crucial question under the
Tanner dictum is whether pursuance of the. intra-union process
would have resulted in a decision not within legally acceptable
bounds. In Western Addition there was an attempt to utilize
intra-union processes that had been established by the majority
representative. The end result of the intra-union process would
have been an arbitration decision on the question of discrimina-
tory promotion policies. Arbitration was not utilized in Western
Addition, therefore no judgment can be made as to what would
have occurred had the process been completed.
The court, rather than applying the Tanner rationale, at-
tempted to distinguish Western Addition from Tanner. The court
cited the absence of cross-purposes between the union and em-
ployees, the attempt to use union machinery, and the fact that the
dismissed workers were acting on behalf of all minority work-
ers.
2 7
Using this approach, the court attempts to avoid a direct con-
frontation with the exclusivity principle and the issue of whether
the principle acts as a deterrent to the attainment of non-dis-
criminatory working conditions. In so doing, the court offers
little help in determining what standards should be applied in the
future.
A NEW APPROACH
The unsatisfactory and inconclusive resolution of the Western
Addition case indicates that a different approach is necessary.
25. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 77 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1971).
26. 485 F.2d 917, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
27. Id. at 929-30.
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That approach must attempt to preserve the effectiveness of the
exclusivity principle while at the same time insuring minority
workers that legitimate questions of racial discrimination will be
dealt with according to the standards prescribed by the federal
government.
The Western Addition court recognized that the principle of
exclusivity can be used as a political shield to protect the bargain-
ing relationship from the legitimate demands of minority em-
ployees. Such a use might occur when a union and an employer
have established a compatable relationship and neither has any
desire to see this relationship jeopardized by a minority group
within the union. Use of the principle as a shield is easily ac-
complished. Since exclusivity is already an established policy of
the Board, employers and unions need only let dissident workers
take independent action, have them discharged by the employers,
have the union make the standard complaint about an unlaw-
ful discharge, and allow the Board and courts to apply the
principle. The result would be an excision of dissident minor-
ity workers and a return to the status quo. The legitimacy of
workers' complaints would never be determined.
Another factor to be considered is the type of racial discrimi-
nation in question. Such subjective activities as membership ex-
aminations, 28 requirements for journeyman status, 29 and tests de-
void of objective controls8" have been found by the courts to be
racially discriminatory practices. Although in some cases the
practices were not discriminatory per se, they were objectionable
in that they prolonged the effects of past discriminatory actions.
Assuming that the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act"' indicates that public policy favors eliminating employment
discrimination, these subjective activities can be seen as the last
residuaries of racial discrimination in the labor-management
area. This is racial discrimination that occurs in such subtle
forms that often the malfeasor is unaware of his misdeeds. It is
the legacy of a generation whose lives span the period from the
last gasps of a segregated society to the early years of an in-
tegrated society. Further compounding the difficulty of this
task are present policies of neutral character that perpetuate
past policies of discrimination.82 Seemingly neutral policies, dis-
28. U.S. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
29. Local 53 of Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost I. & A. Wkrs. v. Vogler, 407
F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. Dobbins v. Local 12, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413
(S.D. Ohio 1968).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. (1970).
32. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,
62 COLUM. L. REv. 563 (1962).
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criminatory in effect, can no longer be tolerated.88
The best critics of such discriminatory tactics are the minor-
ity workers themselves. They are most able to determine when
a bargaining. representative is unable to present their best in-
terests. By effectively short circuiting any concerted activity by
the minority workers, the exclusivity principle destroys this po-
tent and necessary force for change and employment equality.
Judge Wysanski, in his dissenting opinion in Western Ad-
dition, notes the implicit contradiction that exists when the ex-
clusivity principle is applied in cases involving racial discrimina-
tion:
When the minority consists of non-whites who seek for them-
selves what they regard as equality of opportunity, it is to be
expected that their position is, if not hostile to, or at least
uncongenial to, certainly not fully shared by, a majority of
whites in the same unit. . . . Hence, it is essentially a de-
nial of justice to allow the white majority to have the power
to preclude the non-whites from dealing directly with the
employer on racial matters, whether or not this is in dis-
paragement of the union representative.
4
Wysanski's suggestion is to construe the Act to avoid such a
result. He would allow a group of minority workers to bar-
gain directly with the employer on "racial issues which affect that
minority in a way different from the way they affect the major-
ity.""5  This approach, while recognizing the need for an exclus-
ive bargaining agent to deal with matters of general concern,
would have the effect of opening channels between minority work-
ers and their employers that previously might not have existed.
Such a departure from accepted procedure, however, requires
close examination with respect to both its legitimacy and effect.
In addition, guidelines would have to be established to limit the
approach to the use for which it is intended. The latter require-
ment is, no doubt, the easiest to fulfill and will be dispensed with
first.
The most obvious criteria for inclusion within the new ap-
proach is that the issue involved be racial in nature and one that
33. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (a high school
completion requirement and general intelligence test did not have a demonstrable
relationship to successful job performance); NLRB v. Mansion House Center
Mgt. Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 477 (8th Cir. 1973) (the court indicated that "passive
good faith [is] not sufficient to erase the continuing stigma which may pervade
a union's segregated membership policies"); Local 53 of Int'l Ass'n of Heat &
Frost I. & A. Wkrs. v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969) (nepotism require-
ment by a previously segregated union was held unlawful since its application
denied future membership to racial minorities).
34. 485 F.2d 917, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
35. Id. at 939.
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affects all the members of a particular minority group. 86 Fur-
thermore, it must be an issue which would normally be a proper
subject of collective bargaining. 7 These two initial requirements
would reduce the frequency of assertions of frivolous issues on
the mere pretext that they involve matters of a racial nature. Al-
though a formal collective bargaining agreement between the em-
ployer and the minority group would not be necessary, assur-
ances of some nature should be made by the employer that any
agreements reached would be incorporated into the employer's pol-
icy of operation. Although the established union represen-
tative would not be directly involved, since no extensive use of
existing union procedures would be undertaken, the racial mi-
nority should be required to notify union officials of their im-
pending action.
The irony of these guidelines is that situations in which they
would most likely be adhered to by all the parties are the situa-
tions in which they are least needed. Except on the occasions
that an unconscious form of racial discrimination arises, the ma-jority of unions and their respective counterparts in management
have attempted to eliminate employment discrimination. The real
need for this new approach will occur where either the union, the
employer, or both are less willing to take positive action to re-
move any lingering discriminatory practices. Unfortunately,
where these recalcitrant parties are encountered, the legality of
this approach will be tested to its fullest prior to any adherence
to guidelines. The critical question therefore remains with the
original issue: will the Board entertain a charge by a group of
minority employees acting outside their union that they are subject
to racially discriminatory practices or will the Board apply the
exclusivity doctrine?
THE ROLE OF THE BOARD
Clearly Congress did not intend to cut off the rights of racial
minorities in the area of labor relations. This is evidenced by
the enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which
is directed specifically towards the elimination of all racial dis-
crimination by union organizations and employers. In adminis-
tering the NLRA, the Board may not foster policies which contra-
36. Although this comment focuses upon the question of racial discrimi-
nation, the rationale could apply to all types of discrimination, including that
of sex, age, religion, or nationality.
37. Under the NLRA, terms and conditions of employment are considered
mandatory subjects for bargaining. A refusal to engage in bargaining on such
matters can result in an unfair labor practice. N.L.R.A. § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.§158(a) (5) (1970).
[Vol. 14
EXCLUSIVITY DOCTRINE
dict other federal labor legislation.88
Since enforcement procedures exist within the framework
of Title VII,89 why should those remedies be bypassed in favor of
action through the Board? Despite the availability of these al-
ternative remedies, the Board offers the greatest degree of exper-
tise in the field of labor-management relations. The Board's in-
vestigation and enforcement procedures ensure that minority
group complaints will get a fair hearing and that only unjustified
and frivolous complaints will be dismissed. Minority workers
probably can be assured that as an agency of the federal govern-
ment, the Board's standards in making these determinations can
be no less than those set forth by the government and that the
Board can utilize the legal machinery that has dealt with labor-
management problems for decades.
Furthermore, Board handling of minority complaints would
lessen the threat of political instability within the union organi-
zations. As mentioned earlier, union officials are presently re-
quired to perform a delicate balancing act. They must, on the
one hand, be responsive to the majority by whom they were elected,
while on the other, perform their duty to fairly represent the mi-
nority members of their union. When issues are raised by a mi-
nority group that could ultimately adversely affect the majority,
the union officials are put in an irreconcilable position. By al-
lowing minority groups to pursue racial issues on their own, union
officials are exculpated from blame for any results adverse to
the majority's interest. This serves to preserve the stability of
the union which is crucial to the maintenance of a strong bargain-
ing position when the interests of all the workers must be pur-
sued.
CONCLUSION
The Western Addition case indicates the conflict between two
goals in the field of labor-management relations. There is the
need for a stable collective bargaining process, which has led to
the development of the exclusivity principle. There is an equally
pressing need for providing equal employment opportunities for
all workers. The conflict arises when a group of minority work-
ers seek to assert their right to employment equality outside of
the process established by their exclusive bargaining representa-
tive.
38. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-58 (1957).
39. If a violation is found, remedies may include reinstatement with back
pay or any other equitable relief that the court deems appropriate. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000(e)(5) et seq. (1972).
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The proposed extension of the protection of the Act to mi-
nority action where it pertains to racial matters involving the en-
tire minority group is an attempt to achieve the realization of both
goals: to further the goal of equal employment opportunity with
only minimal adverse effect upon the stability of the collective
bargaining relationship.
To assuage the fears and mistrust that still linger among
minority groups, the most impartial body available should be per-
mitted to adjudicate any claims that arise. In labor-manage-
ment relations, the National Labor Relations Board provides such
a forum. The attractiveness of this approach is that it is a self-
terminating concept. When true integration occurs, the need for
the approach no longer exists. This fact, alone, should work as
an incentive to remove the last vestiges of racial discrimination.
Daniel F. Altemus, Jr.
